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WIELDING THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE AGE OF
LEGAL REALISM
Roger A. Fairfax,Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A new progressive movement in the law profoundly affected the
American judicial climate of the 1930s and 1940s. The jurisprudence of
American Legal Realism, which sprang from the progressive American
sociological jurisprudence, boasted the adherence of some of America's
most influential legal minds. Legal Realism, which complemented the
New Deal reform legislation emerging in the 1930s, advocated judicial
deference to legislative and administrative channels on matters of social
and economic policy. Judicial activism, which had been used as a tool for
the protection of economic rights since the late nineteenth century, was
seen as inimical to progressive social reform and, thus, was discouraged
by Legal Realists, who saw the Supreme Court consistently strike down
progressive reform measures through the mid-1930s. 1 After the New Deal
constitutional revolution of 1937, the Supreme Court began to practice
restraint, and the ideology of Legal Realism rose to prominence.
At the same time, the political climate of the 1930s and 1940s was, to
say the very least, inhospitable to Black demands on Congress and state
A.B., Harvard College, 1994; M.A., University of London, 1995; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1998. 1 would like to thank A. Leon Higginbotham, Morton Horwitz, Randall
Kennedy, and Gary McDowell for commenting on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
In addition, I would like to thank the participants in the 1998 Charles Hamilton
Houston Symposium, held February 20-21, 1998 at Harvard Law School. Their
insights on the life and legacy of Charles Hamilton Houston provided inspiration for
this project. All errors, of course, are mine.
1. Defining judicial activism is problematic due to the lack of consensus among those
attempting to articulate its core meaning. Judicial activism has been defined by some
as "the practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by other governmental
officials or institutions that the Constitution does not dearly prohibit." Lino A.
Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism,It's judicialActivism, 19 HARv. J.L. & PuB. Pol'y 293,
296 (1996). Others have defined judicial activism simply as a result-oriented approach
to interpreting the Constitution. See Jennelle L. Joset, May It Please the Constitution:
judicial Activism and Its Effect on Criminal Procedure, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 1021, 1021
(1996). For the purposes of this Article, the term "judicial activism" is defined as a
mode of judicial review, the adherents of which use the power of the judicial function
to effect social or economic policy changes outside of legislative or administrative
channels. See Carroll Rhodes, Changing the Constitutional Guarantee of Voting Rights
From Color-Consciousto Color-Blind: Judicial Activism by the Rehnquist Court, 16 Miss.
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legislatures for racial justice. Throughout most of the American South,
Blacks were prevented, through both legal and extra-legal means, from
exercising their right to vote. And in Northern states, where attempts to
quiet the Black franchise were not as overt, Black numbers were not great
enough to influence state and national legislative politics significantly.
Furthermore, many "progressive" White legislators were unwilling or
unable to pass laws that restored Black civil rights. In addition, this lack
of Black political efficacy was mirrored in the general reluctance of presidential administrations to use the power of the federal government to
protect the civil rights of Blacks.
Charles Hamilton Houston, the chief architect of the legal assault on
Jim Crow laws, sought a new method for pursuing Black equality before
the law. Heavily influenced by sociological jurisprudence, but recognizing
the inadequacy of Legal Realism and its philosophy of deference to the
legislature for racial justice, Houston developed the philosophy of "social
engineering." This jurisprudence borrowed from sociological jurisprudence-an antecedent of Legal Realism-but prompted jurists to challenge
statutes and state actions that denied full citizenship rights to Americans
who were Black. Houston's encouragement of judicial activism is significant both for its incompatibility with Legal Realism and because judicial activism had been used for over a century to diminish the constitutional status of Blacks in America-first to deny Blacks their constitutional
existence and, later, to remove the teeth from the very laws and amendments meant to reaffirm that existence. This Article argues that Houston's
reliance on judicial activism, despite its past abuses by those opposed to
his cause, signaled the beginning of the end of the liberal consensus on
the principle of judicial restraint. Charles Hamilton Houston's wielding
of the double-edged sword of judicial activism was antecedent to the
Warren Court activism that brought about many of the civil rights gains
of the second half of the twentieth century.
II. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Charles Hamilton Houston was born to William and Mary Houston
on September 3, 1895 in Washington, D.C. Despite the inequalities associC. L. REv. 309, 344 n.240 (quoting GLENDON SHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-LAKING 153,

154 (1965)). This power is usually used to either challenge or uphold legislation by
applying an expansive or restrictive interpretation of constitutional protections
against state or federal actions. The term "judicial restraint" is defined as the'mode
of judicial review roughly opposite judicial activism-a general reluctance to use

judicial discretion in all but the dearest cases of constitutional violation. See Sanford
Levinson, Raoul Berger Pleads for Judicial Activism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 773, 777 (1996).

While it cannot be claimed that this definition of judicial activism and restraint is
exhaustive and without valid criticism, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLuM. L. REv. 873, 903 (1987) (describing the lack of an objective "baseline for
measurement of departures from neutrality and of action and inaction" by judges),
it captures the fundamental essence of these modes of judicial review which will be
discussed repeatedly throughout this Article. For a definitional overview of judicial
activism and judicial restraint and their respective roles in the American constitutional order, see CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICiAL AcTvsM: BuLWARK OF FREEDOM OR
PRECARIOUS SEcurrY? 2-32 (1991).
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ated with the District of Columbia's severely segregated public school
system, Houston attended an elementary school that accommodated his
accelerated capacity for learning. Houston opted for extra summer school
courses and consequently graduated from junior high school at the age
of twelve. Early in2 1908, Houston began his studies at the renowned M
Street High School.
While Houston was in high school, his father William resigned from
his government clerk job to serve as an apprentice for Edward Morris, a
prominent Black Chicago attorney. In 1910, when William Houston returned to the District from Chicago, he began private practice while
teaching evening law classes at Howard University.3 The following year,
Houston graduated from M Street High School at the age of fifteen and
was admitted to Amherst College. In September of 1911, he entered Amherst as the sole Black member of the class of 1915 and, despite the
expected racism that 4Houston encountered, he was well liked by classmates and professors.

An English major, Houston maintained an eighty-eight percent grade
point average throughout his tenure at Amherst. He was elected to Phi
Beta Kappa his senior year and was chosen to deliver one of the commencement addresses. After receiving his Bachelor's degree in English in
1915-at the age of nineteen, Houston began to teach English at Howard
University despite his father's wishes that he attend law school and join
him in private practice5 When the United States entered World War I, in
1917, Houston was of draft age. Aware of the mistreatment of Black
enlisted soldiers in the military, Houston and a number of other Black
college graduates formed the Central Committee of Negro College Men,
the purpose of which was to lobby the War Department and elected
officials for the establishment of a Black officers training camp.6 After
many appeals, a Black officer training camp was set up in Des Moines,
Iowa and Houston was assigned. In October 1917, Houston
was commis7
sioned a first lieutenant in the United States Arm=y
Despite his officer's rank, Houston still felt the sting of racism in the
United States military Houston and other Black officers were segregated
from the White officers on the base and were consistently denied the
opportunity to serve as artillery officers.8 White officers would embarrass
2. The M Street High School, later named the Paul Laurence Dunbar High School,
became known as the model for excellence in secondary Black education. Black
students-most of them privileged-from all over the greater Washington area sought
M Street's classical curriculum, which was taught by graduates of elite colleges and
universities. Dunbar High School, the nation's first Black public high school, has
produced literally hundreds of prominent and influential Blacks who impacted the
District of Columbia and the nation at large. See THOMAS SOWELL, EDUCATION:
ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORY 29-32 (1986); Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence: the Case
of Dunbar High School, 35 PUBLIC INTEREST 1, 3-21 (1974).
3. See GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIvIL RIGHTS 26-27 (1983).
4. See id. at 31-33.
5. Genna Rae McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston, 1895-1950,32 How. L.J. 469,470 (1989).
6. On efforts to establish the Black officers training camp, see JOYCE B. Ross, E. SPINCAN AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP, 1911-1939 81-102 (1972).

7. See McNEIL, supra note 3, at 36-40. See also Ross, supra note 6, at 81-102.
8. See McNEIL, supra note 3, at 40-41.
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and harass the black officers in front of European civilians.9 Houston and
several fellow Black officers were almost lynched by White American
officers in France.10 However, it was the unfair court martial of an innocent
black officer that ultimately would compel Houston to attend law school
following his military service." As Houston wrote of his trials during his
military years, "I made up my mind that I would never get caught again
without knowing something about my rights; that if luck was with me,
and I got through this war, I would study
law and use my time fighting
2
for men who could not strike back."'
A disillusioned and bitter Charles Hamilton Houston returned to a
nation whose race relations by 1919 had deteriorated since he had left for
the foreign war. The summer of 1919 was one of the worst periods for
race relations in the nation's history. 3 The wave of race riots that swept
the nation was particularly intense in Houston's hometown of Washington, D.C. 14 This time of intense racial strife and Houston's negative experience in the military may have galvanized his resolve to study the law.
In September of 1919, Houston enrolled in Harvard Law School.'5
During his first year at Harvard, Houston distinguished himself, earning top marks and seemed "[u]ndaunted by the rigor and the pace at
which Harvard legal education was conducted."' 6 Houston had an even
stronger academic performance his second year and was elected to the
editorial board of volume 35 of the Harvard Law Review-the first African American to serve as an editor of the prestigious journal. 7 Houston's
academic performance was so strong that he caught the attention of
several professors and administrators, including Dean Roscoe Pound,
who would serve as a mentor and advisor throughout his career. 8 Houston also was mentored by Professors Joseph Beale and Felix Frankfurter.
The latter, who "had taken a special interest in Houston while he was a
Harvard student,"19 also would continue to serve as Houston's advisor
after Harvard Law School.
In 1922, after graduating with honors with his LL.B., Houston went
on to study, again at Harvard, for his S.J.D. on a Langdell Scholarship. 0
Houston continued to excel in his academic work, earning an "A" grade
9.
10.
11.
12.

See id. at 43-44.
See id. at 44.
See id. at 41-42.
Charles Hamilton Houston, Saving the World for Democracy, PIrrSBURGH
Aug. 24,1940.

COURIER,

13. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWiN v BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICAs STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 109-13 (1975).

14. See CONSTANCE McLAUGHLIN GREEN, THE SECREr CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATNONs IN Tm NATION'S CAPITAL 190-94 (1967).
15. See

BLACKS AT HARVARD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERiENCE AT HARVARD AND RADCLIFFE 5 (Werner Sollors, et al., eds., 1993).

16. McNEIL, supra note 3, at 50.
17. Houston served as a leader of the Nile Club, Harvard's Black students association,
see SOLLORS, supra note 15, at 191-92, and was also instrumental in founding the
Dunbar Law Club for the Black and Jewish students who were excluded from
membership in the mainstream law clubs. See McNEiL, supra note 3, at 51-52.
18. See McNEIL, supra note 3, at 52.
19. MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE
BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 53 (1994).
20. See McNEiL, supra note 3, at 53.
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average, 21 with Professor Frankfurter advising his doctoral dissertation in
administrative law. Despite these accomplishments, Houston had not yet
quenched his thirst for learning. In 1923, Houston received the Sheldon
Traveling Fellowship and continued his legal studies in the civil law
program at the University of Madrid in Spain, where he spent some time
corresponding with Roscoe Pound and studying Pound's Outlines on Jurisprudence.23
Upon returning from Spain, Houston was admitted to practice law in
the District of Columbia and entered into private practice with his father.
In 1927, Houston co-authored his first United States Supreme Court brief.24
Although it dealt with an industrial tort case and not a civil rights case,
it was the first of many Supreme Court briefs Houston would file during
his career. However, in the late 1920s, the young Houston was more
interested in teaching law than practicing law, and he sought an appointment as a professor in the evening program at Howard University Law
School.
On the recommendations of Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter, Houston was offered a teaching position and quickly gained a reputation for
being an intense and demanding professor, earning him the nickname
"Iron Shoes."15 Outside teaching his evening classes in Agency, Surety
Mortgages, Jurisprudence, and Administrative Law, Houston sought to
enhance the law school's effectiveness; he was named Vice Dean of Howard
Law School in 1929.6
While at Harvard, "Houston studied under some of the nation's greatest legal minds, and they convinced him it was necessary to develop a
cadre of competent black lawyers to fight for the rights of black Americans." 27 As Vice Dean of Howard Law School, Houston sought to do just
that by installing more rigorous admission standards, a new curriculum,
21. See id.
22. Charles H. Houston, Government is a Practical Affair: A Functional Study of the
Requirements of Notice and Hearing in Governmental Action in the United States
(1923), Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law School, Administrative Law Theses.
23. See Papers of Roscoe Pound, Harvard Law School Modem Manuscript Collection,
Langdell Library, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (various correspondence
between Houston and Pound, 1923-1924).
24. In the 1927 case of Bountiful Brick Company v. Elizabeth Giles, 276 U.S. 154, Houston
successfully argued for the upholding of a lower court's decision to compensate the
widow of a worker killed in a work-related accident. See McNErL, supra note 3, at
62.
25. See Leland Ware, A Difference in Emphasis: Charles Houston's Transformation of Legal
Education, 32 How. L.J. 479, 485 (1989).
26. When Houston became Vice Dean, Howard Law School was unaccredited and offered a relatively substandard education. Howard mirrored the state of Black legal
education in general. At the time, there were only one thousand Black lawyers in the
nation-less than one percent of the national total-and fewer than 100 of them had
graduated from top law schools. See HARVARD SrrxoF, A NEw DEAL FOR BLAcKS:
ThE EMERGENCE OF CivIL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL IssuE, VOLUME I: Ti
DECADE 217-18 (1978). In addition, not one civil rights law course was

DEPRESSION

offered in the

United States. See id.
27. DAvis & CLARK, supra note 19, at 53. Among those prompting Houston to help

Howard produce more effective civil rights advocates was Justice Louis Brandeis.
Brandeis asserted that the quality of briefs submitted to the Supreme Court by Black
lawyers needed to be enhanced. W.E.B. DuBois argued that the poor quality of
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a new full-time faculty, and eliminating the school's evening division.2
This was the first step in the creation of the Howard machine that would
define the legalistic approach to civil rights.29 Houston was unrelenting in
his vision of creating a school for the training of "Black lawyers who
would actively and aggressively represent and advocate for the rights of
the Black citizenry [which was] vital to the struggle for the equality of
Blacks within American society."' ° In the fall of 1930, while Houston dealt
with improving Howard Law School, he became acquainted with one of
the first-year students, a young Thurgood Marshall, who would go on to
graduate as valedictorian of the class of 1933.
During his time as Vice Dean, Houston worked as an attorney for the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
with increasing frequency, often involving Thurgood Marshall and other
students in cases he was litigating. Opportunity for further involvement
presented itself when Houston's former Harvard colleague, Nathan Margold, resigned as special counsel to the NAACP Houston, whose name
was presented for consideration along wfth the likes of Felix Frankfurter,
came highly recommended. While they had never had a Black special
counsel, NAACP leaders, aware of the animosity toward civil rights litigation, particularly in the South, felt that "a colored lawyer with the
dignity, ability and tact of Mr. Houston would encounter far less hostility
than a white lawyer."3 ' In 1935, Houston took a leave of absence from
Howard and accepted the position as special counsel to the NAACP. A
year later, he named Thurgood Marshall as his assistant special counsel.
While in New York, Houston spent his time dealing with a variety of
issues. He traveled frequently, documenting disparities in the quality of
Black and White public schools in the South as well as speaking to groups
across the nation about the burgeoning NAACP legal campaign against
discrimination in educational opportunity.32 Houston also spent a good
deal of time helping to develop the newly organized National Bar Association, formed in 1925 because of the American Bar Association's refusal
to admit Black members of the barP Houston also aggressively lobbied
advocacy was a major factor in the continued legal subjugation of Black Americans.
See SrroFF, supra note 26, at 217.
28. See Charles Hamilton Houston, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 595, 597-98 (1993).
29. See generally Genna Rae McNeil, Justiciable Cause: Howard University Law School and
the Struggle for Civil Rights, 22 How. L.J. 283 (1979) (describing the key role played
by Howard University Law School in the civil rights movement).

30. Charles Hamilton Houston, supra note 28, at 599. As a result of Houston's efforts,
Howard received accreditation from the American Bar Association's Council on Legal
Education, New York State, and the Association of American Law Schools in 1931.
See McNErL, supra note 3, at 75.
31. MARK V

ThSHNET,

THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED

EDUCATION,

1925-1950 29 (1987) (quoting Letter from Walter White to Nathan Margold, May 22,
1934, NAACP papers Box I-C-196).
32. See NAACP papers, A-393, Box 2, Reel 2, Government Documents, Lamont Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (various correspondence outlining travel itin-

eraries).
33. See NAACP papers, A-393, Box 2, Reel 2, Government Documents, Lamont Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (various correspondence between Houston
and other officers of the National Bar Association).
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Franklin D. Roosevelt's attorney general, Homer Cummings, to nominate
a Black lawyer to the federal bench.3 However, work on the new NAACP
litigation campaign dominated Houston's time and had him in close
contact with field marshals like Thurgood Marshall, who was litigating
the case of a Black law school applicant who was rejected from the
University of Maryland on the basis of race. 5
By 1938, Houston again prepared to make a change when lack of
NAACP funding prompted him to return to Washington and rejoin his
father's law practice.3 6 In 1940, Houston resigned as special counsel to the
NAACP and began work with the NAACP's National Legal Committee
in Washington. Thurgood Marshall was named to succeed Houston as
special counsel to the NAACP. Shortly thereafter, the NAACP decided
that it was necessary to create a separate, financially independent entity
that specifically dealt with litigation of civil rights cases. As a result,
Marshall was named as the first Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF).3 7 Houston, although not officially
affiliated with LDF, continued as one of its greatest resources, working on
building a team of talented civil rights lawyers who could break the back
of segregation in the United States.3
Eschewing potential judicial appointments, Houston sought to affect
the bar through his advocacy in the National Bar Association and the
National Lawyer's Guild.39 Outside of his NAACP work, Houston provided legal-assistance to a variety of causes, including the effort to desegregate the District of Columbia public school system.4° Also, while engaging in private practice in Washington, Houston found himself increasingly
involved with extra-legal attempts to achieve equality, serving in the

34. See Letter from Houston to Homer S. Cummings, July 12, 1935, NAACP Papers,

A-393, Box 2, Reel 1, Government Documents, Lamont Library Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass. These efforts culminated in the 1937 appointment of William

Henry Hastie as federal judge in the Virgin Islands. Hastie, who was also educated
at M Street High School, Amherst College, and Harvard Law School, was a second
cousin of Houston's and, at one time, was a partner in the Washington, D.C. Houston

& Houston firm. For more on Hastie, see

GILBERT WARE, WILLiAM HASTrE: GRACE

UNDER PREssURE (1984).

35. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (1936).
36. See NAACP Papers, Box 2, Reel 2, Government Documents, Lamont Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass. (NAACP press release (undated, circa 1938)).
37. LDF was founded on March 20, 1940, primarily to absorb the skyrocketing costs
associated with civil rights litigation. Thurgood Marshall, who drafted its charter,
performed both the function of chief litigator and chief fundraiser. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN TrE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND O1 LAwYERS FOUGHT FOR
THE

CivI.

RIGHTS REVOLUTION

14-25 (1994) (describing the history of the NAACP

Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
38. See McNmL, supra note 3, at 156.
39. See Letters between Francis Biddle and Felix Frankfurter, May I and 4, 1942, Papers
of William H. Hastie (1916-1976), Harvard Law School Modem Manuscript Collection, Langdell Library, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. See also McNEIL, supra
note 3, at 188.
40. Houston's fight against discrimination in the D.C. public schools culminated in the
brief for Boiling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 597 (1954), which was filed by James Nabrit, shortly
after Houston's death. KLUGER, supra note 13, at 508-23; see McNEiL, supra note 3, at
188-90.

24 u HARVARD BLACi<LEITIER LAW JOURNAL 0 VOL. 14, 1998
federal government as counsel to, and as a presidentially appointed member of, the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC).41 Houston also
advocated on behalf of the District of Columbia home rule movement,u
and sought to expose corruption in the election campaigns of segregationist members of Congress."
Houston participated in the most significant anti-discrimination and
anti-segregation cases of the era. Indeed, the strategy of the NAACP's
legal function during the late 1930s and 1940s was essentially the strategy
of Charles Hamilton Houston. Houston, who also served as chief legal
strategist in cases outside of the purview of the NAACP, led the legal fight
against racial discrimination in six major areas: education, labor, housing,
voting, jury exclusion, and transportation. As precedents which upheld
state sponsored discrimination and segregation were increasingly threatened, Houston's legal battles would produce widespread notoriety.
I Sadly, Houston never would have the opportunity to see the achievement of his ultimate goal. Worn down from decades of intense devotion
to the cause of racial justice, he suffered a heart attack late in 1949 and
finally succumbed on April 22, 1950. With him died a determination and
spirit that would not be replicated. However, Houston left behind a unique
philosophy of law that would be perpetuated by the talented civil rights
attorneys whom he had trained, shaped, and inspired. While on his deathbed, Houston wrote these words to be read years later to his then infant
son: "Tell Bo I did not run out on him but went down fighting that he
might have better and broader opportunities than I had without prejudice
or bias operating against him, and in any fight some fall.""
Houston's dream of breaking the stranglehold that segregation had on
public schools began to be realized on May 17, 1954, a little more than
four years after his death. On that day, Chief Justice Earl Warren read the
unanimous decision of the Court in the case of Brown v. Board of Education," which reversed the "separate but equal" doctrine put forth in the
1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson." Brown would prove to be the beginning
of the end of lawful segregation in schools, public places, transportation,
and other segments of American society.

41. The FEPC, established by Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802, was meant to

address discrimination in labor. Houston was appointed as a full committee member

by Roosevelt in 1944. He resigned out of protest in 1945 when President Truman
failed to eliminate discrimination from firms over which he had gained direct control
through his wartime powers. See McNEIL, supra note 3, at 166-74.
42. See id. at 197.
43. CHARLES H. HouSTON & THuRGOOD MARSHALL, IN THE MATTER OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY CAMPAIGN OF SENATOR THEODORE G. BILBo, SENATOR, STATE
OF MIssIssrppi-BRIEF FOR THE NAACP TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES, 1946, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 79TH

CONGRESS (1946).
44. Houston's inscription to his son on page 48 of JOSHUA LIEBMAN, PEACE OF MIND

- (1946) (cited in McNEIL, supra note 3, at 212).

45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Ill. DEFINING HOUSTON'S SOCIAL ENGINEERING
JURISPRUDENCE
In a 1989 article, Professor J. Clay Smith asked, "how do ideas like
Houston's find sanctuary in the jurisprudential matrix?" 47 To define
Houstonian jurisprudence comprehensively and place it within the American jurisprudential matrix requires, as Smith writes, "study, discussion
and an investigation of law and the history of law by scholars who believe
that the Houstonian ideas merit preservation." 4 As of yet, relatively few
scholars have undertaken the task of documenting and attempting to
define Houstonian jurisprudence.4 However, this lack of treatment may
be due less to a dearth of interest in Houston's legal philosophy than to
lack of exposure. The first known mention of a Houstonian school of
jurisprudence can be found in a 1973 article by Smith and, until the
publication of the seminal biography in 1983, Houston was virtually
unknown by all but the closest students of the legal struggle against
5,
discrimination before the Brown decision.
Another reason for the absence of a body of critical scholarship surrounding Houstonian jurisprudence is the difficulty of defining what that
jurisprudence entails. The Houstonian school of jurisprudence is not an
easily discernible legal philosophy embodied in law review articles or
other scholarly works by Houston.5 1 With such dynamic and multi-faceted
roles in the struggle against racial discrimination, Houston had little opportunity to submit scholarly appraisals of his ideas even to law journals
that might have dared to publish articles written by a Black civil rights
lawyer 2
However, as has been asserted, "Houston's Summa Theologica was the
plan of action contained in his many letters and briefs."5 3 This plan of
action embodied various principles supporting Houston's legal philosophy. The documents containing Houston's ideas have been well preserved
in archives of the Library of Congress, Howard University, Harvard Law
School, the NAACP, and in Houston's private law firm. The Houstonian
school of jurisprudence, though slightly unearthed, is still waiting to be
fully discovered:
The time has arrived, if not, long past due for legal scholars to
search the annals of case law, briefs, letters, opinions and other
47. J. Clay Smith, PrinciplesSupplementing the HoustonianSchool of Jurisprudence:Occasional
PaperNo. 1, 32 How L.J. 493, 503 (1989).
48. Id. at 503.

49. See Steven H. Hobbs, From the Shoulders of Houston: A Vision for Social and Economic

Justice, 32 How. L.J. 505 (1989); Michael W. Reed, The Contributionof CharlesHamilton
Houston to American Jurisprudence,30 How. LJ. 1095, 1095-1100 (1987); Smith, supra
note 47, at 493-504.

50. See J. Clay Smith, In Memoriam: Professor FrankD. Reeves, Towards a HoustonianSchool
of Jurisprudenceand the Study of Pure Legal Existence, 18 How. LJ. 1, 1-11 (1973).
51. Reed, supra note 49, at 1098 n.21 ("Charles Houston did not write a treatise or a series
of law review articles which established the foundation for a school of jurisprudence.").
52. McNE L, supra note 3, at 216 ("[Houston] was a legal scholar-teacher-practitioner

who became so involved in struggle that he wrote neither treatises nor lengthy law
review articles.").
53. Reed, supra note 49, at 1098.
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statements in order to trace the analytical process which Houston
uniquely and indelibly left imprinted in American jurisprudence. 4
An examination of Houston's briefs, letters, and statements elicits the
conclusion that Houstonian jurisprudence is built around the key concept
of "social engineering." Houston's assertions that "[a] lawyer is either a
social engineer or... a parasite on society"-" and that a lawyer as a social
engineer is "the mouthpiece of the weak and a sentinel guarding against
wrong" were representative of his belief in social engineering as a channel
toward change. 56 Social engineering, as Houston saw it, involves the use
of "the Constitution, statutes, and 'whatever science demonstrates or imagination invents' both
to foster and to order social change for a more
57
humane society."
Houston believed that the social engineer "was a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who understood the Constitution of the United
States and knew how to explore its uses in the solving of 'problems of...
local communities" and in 'bettering conditions of the underprivileged
dtizens."'8 Furthermore, the social engineer "ought to use the law as an
instrument to achieve social justice and full, equal civil rights for all
Americans." 59 Another crucial role of the social engineer was "to engage
in 'a carefully planned [program] to secure decisions, rulings and public
opinion on ...broad principle[s],'" a role that Houston would revolutionize throughout his career.6°
Houston, while Vice Dean and professor at Howard Law School,
"published, litigated and taught with fervor for the purpose of instilling
in law students and young lawyers the principles of his 'social engineering' philosophy" 61 Houston did not equivocate when it came to his expectations for the students he trained in civil rights advocacy: "Students
were called upon to become not only skilled lawyers but also 'social
engineers" seeking and developing solutions through the application of
law to problems of segregation and racism." 62
Houston helped to fuel a new generation of young lawyers who
would use the Constitution and its provisions as the main weapon against
racism: "As he explained to his students, discrimination, injustice, and the
denial of full citizenship rights and opportunities on the basis of race and
a background of slavery could be challenged within the context of the
54. Smith, supra note 50, at 6-7 n.22.
55. McNEIL, supra note 3, at 84 (quoting Thurgood Marshall in GERALDINE SEGAL, IN
ANY FIGHT SoME FALL 34 (1975)).

56. Id. at 85 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, Law as a Career,July 27, 1932, Charles
Hamilton Houston/Houston & Gardner firm files); see also Herbert 0. Reid, Introduction, Charles Hamilton Houston Commemorative Issue, 32 How. LJ. 461, 461 (1989)
("Houston developed a school of jurisprudence which observes law as an organism
for social justice through social engineering.").

57. McNEIL, supra note 3, at 133 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, Law as a Career,
July 27, 1932, Charles Hamilton Houston/Houston & Gardner firm files).
58. Id. at 84.
59. Hobbs, supra note 49, at 508.
60. NAACP, ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1934).
61. McNeil, supra note 5, at 471.
62. McNeil, supra note 29, at 288.
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Constitution if it were creatively, innovatively interpreted and used."6
Many of Houston's students, including Thurgood Marshall, would go on
to use and interpret the Constitution in a way that would eventually break
the back of racial discrimination in America.
Houston's jurisprudence of social engineering "grew out of research,
study, [and] ideological as well as ethical considerations."6 Three main
moral jurisprudential principles undergird Houston's legal philosophy of
social engineering: (1) "[T]he law and constituted authority [were] supreme only as they cover[ed] the most humble and forgotten citizen;"61
(2) "Human beings, regardless of. their differences, were 'each equally
entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;' ' 61 and (3) "[Iln a
good society, its system of government 'guarantees justice and freedom
for everyone' while providing for succeeding generations 'better and broader
opportunities... without prejudice or bias operating against [them]." 67
Another key element in Houston's philosophical grounding was his
avowed faith in democracy Houston realized, however, "that democracy
could not survive if the rights of the minority were continually denied
and the State fostered the continuation of a caste system based on race."68
Thus, Houston's social engineering philosophy sought to secure the rights
of the minority and strike at the heart of state-sponsored discrimination.
Houston's desire to vindicate the principles of the American Constitution
resulted in a "reliance on resort to courts for gaining recognition of [Blacks']
constitutional rights." 69
The use of the courts was central to Houston's social engineering
philosophy because of "its potential with respect to promoting a nondiscriminatory interpretation of the Constitution or federal statutes." 70 Houston believed fervently that "demands could be made on the system's
courts with the results being changes in the common law."7' This transformation of the common law, which Houston visualized, would be produced when the courts "rendered decisions supportive of the protection
of the civil rights of African-Americans." For Houston, this was the goal
of the social engineer.

63. McNEiL, supra note 3, at 84-85.
64. McNeil, supra note 5, at 471.
65. McNErL, supra note 3, at 213 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston letter to Stephen
Early, August 16, 1933, Charles Hamilton Houston/Houston & Gardner firm case

files).
66. Charles Hamilton Houston, An Approach to Better Race Relations, May 5, 1934,
(address before the YWCA Convention, New York City).

67. McNEL, supra note 3, at 213 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, untitled tape
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

recording [c. December, 1949]) (on file with Houston family).
Reed, supra note 49, at 1100.
McNEIL, supra note 3, at 218.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 218.
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND
THE PROGRESSIVE LEGAL TRADITION
It is imperative to examine how Houston's "social engineering" jurisprudence related to the progressive legal tradition: Legal Realism and its
predecessor, sociological jurisprudence. This not only highlights the similarities between the two judicial traditions, but also illuminates the key
incompatibility. The tension between the jurisprudential strands-mainly
social engineering and Legal Realism-over the role of the courts would
produce a chasm between the progressive mode of thought and the civil
rights legal establishment. This gap in understanding would usher in the
peculiar use of judicial activism for progressive ends in the Warren Court
era.
The sociological school of jurisprudence, which gained popularity in
the United States in the early twentieth century, undoubtedly influenced
Houston's legal philosophy. American sociological jurisprudence has roots
that can be traced back to Montesquieu. 73 Eugen Ehrlich, the man who
developed the modem sociological school of law, believed that "social
phenomena in the legal sphere . . . are of importance for' a scientific
understanding of law."74 Therefore, those charged with interpreting law
should consider "all social forces which lead to the creation of law."75 The
general thrust of sociological jurisprudence is that the "positive law can76
not be understood apart from the social norms of the 'living law.'

American sociological jurisprudence followed the example of its European predecessors in stressing the need for jurists to shed their tendency
towards "mechanical jurisprudence,"7 the mode of legal thought canonized by the Classical Legal Thinkers from 1895 to 1937.78 Those within the
OF LAW 473 (Walter L. Moll trans., Harvard University Press, 1936) ("The man who, a century and a
half ago, wrote the three words L' Esprit Des Lois as the title of his book surely was
seeking a sociology of law within his own soul even at that early date."); Eugen
Ehrlich, Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence,29 HARv. L. REv. 582, 583 (1916).
74. Id. at 474.
75. Id.

73. See EUGEN E-RLIcH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF TM SOCIOLOGY

76. EDGAR BODEN-EIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW

114 (1974) (quoting Filmer S.C. Northrop, Ethical Relativism in the Light of Recent Legal
Science, 64 1. Pm-L.651 (1955)).
77. The term "mechanical jurisprudence" was coined by Roscoe Pound in the early 20th
century. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanicalfurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 605 (1908).
78. The Classical Legal school of thought was marked by a well-intentioned attempt to
produce a philosophical or scientific arrangement of the law. The result of this
movement was the categorization of scattered branches of certain types of law under
headings, such as "negligence" and "fault" in tort law. In contract law, there were
dear distinctions made between contract "rights" and contract "remedies." This strict
categorization facilitated the syllogistic type of decision-making that defined the
Classical Legal Thinkers. The result of this formalistic jurisprudence was the rise of
the laissez-faire conception of freedom of contract which was interpreted as originating in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The era in which the
Classical Legal Thinkers held sway (about 1895 until 1937) is commonly called the
Lochner era named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the case which read
the "freedom-of-contract" into the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 60.
Progressive legislative attempts of social reform at the expense of capital were
consistently thwarted by an activist United States Supreme Court armed with the
essentially laissez-faire conceptions of substantive economic due process, freedom of
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sociological school of jurisprudence felt that law should not be derived
through supposed universal and axiomatic first principles, but rather
through a study of the sociological factors that underlie the law:79
American sociological jurisprudence denies that the law can be
understood without regard for the realities of human social life
....Sociological jurists urge that a judge who wishes to fulfill his
functions in a satisfactory way must have an intimate knowledge
of the social and economic factors which shape and influence the

law. 0

Houston first came into contact with sociological jurisprudence at
Harvard Law School, where he studied Jurisprudence under Roscoe Pound
as part of his S.J.D. program.8' Pound's philosophy of law had great
contract, and private property rights through the late 1930s. Until 1937-the popularly recognized end of the period when the Classical legal school of thought dominated American jurisprudence-the path the Supreme Court took was marked with
an activism rivaled in American history only by that of the post-Brown courts. Over
50 Acts of Congress and 400 state statutes were invalidated from 1898 to 1937. This
can be compared to the Supreme Court's striking down of 12 Acts of Congress and
125 state laws during the 25 years prior to 1898. See GARY L. McDoWELL, CURBING
THE COURTS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE

LIMrrs

OF JUDICIAL POWER

3 (1988). See

also MORTON J. HoRwrrz, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRi-

SIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: ATITrUDE OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1976); EDWARD A.
PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).

79. Among the most prominent of American sociological jurisprudes were Louis D.
Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, and Roscoe Pound. The
contributions of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Pound to the rise of American
sociological jurisprudence are immeasurable. To be sure, an in-depth comparison of
their philosophies brings forth differences that distinguish them from each other.
However, in keeping with the sociological school of thought, all four men held social
considerations to be paramount in the judicial process and rejected the formalistic
reasoning of the Classical Legal Thinkers. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (Louis Brandeis, brief for the respondent); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,dissenting); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1920); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); Oliver Wendell

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897); Roscoe Pound, The Scope
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,24 HARv. L. REv. 591 (1911) (Part I), 25 HARv.
L. REv. 140 (1912) (Part I), 25 HARv.L. REv 489 (Part Ill).
80. BODENHEIMER, supra note 76, at 120-21.
81. At Harvard, the nation's top institution of legal education of that era, Pound was
working from a very visible platform, where many of the nation's top legal scholars
were situated. In 1911, Pound published, perhaps, the most influential scholarly work
of the American sociological jurisprudes. See Pound, supra note 79. Pound's lengthy,
three-part article traces the development of sociological jurisprudence from its antecedents in social utilitarianism until the "emergence of Sociological Jurisprudence as
a discrete and definable philosophy of law." G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century
America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1004 (1972).
Pound's article recognizes the various contributing factors to sociological jurisprudence and demonstrates his own philosophy on the role of the new "science" in
20th-century jurisprudence. Pound would continue to shape and influence American
sociological jurisprudence for another forty years, writing numerous books and articles,
and influencing legal thought throughout three of the most turbulent periods in
American legal history: the rise of Legal Realism, the New Deal constitutional revo-
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impact on Houston and "represented the final tie between Houston and
the advocates of sociological jurisprudence."8 2 Pound's influence on Houston was later reflected in Houston's legal philosophy1
Houston, through his legal advocacy, urged judges to incorporate
practical knowledge of the factors that shaped discriminatory laws in the
United States. He demonstrated how certain state actions, which seemed
constitutional on their face, violated the civil rights of certain groups of
citizens when coupled with the social realities of segregated America.
When this occurred, Houston wanted the courts to take over the essentially legislative function of incorporating practical knowledge into the
judicial function of constitutional adjudication. In this way, Houston incorporated sociological jurisprudence into his philosophy:
Undoubtedly, Pound's view that judicial and legislative functions,
while separate, at times ran together in the "judicial ascertainment
of the common law by analogical application of decided cases"
was a catalyst as Houston urged black social engineers to prepare
for arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court.8
Throughout his legal and teaching career, Houston kept in rather close
contact with Pound, who served as an informal advisor during Houston's
"Harvardization" of Howard Law School.rs Pound, who advocated the
use of law in "a continually more efficacious social engineering,"6 undoubtedly continued to influence Houston long after the latter left Harvard Law School in 1923. Houston, like Pound, continually advocated
bringing law closer to reality and this became "the preferred strategy of
the legal leadership of the NAACP, men who had themselves been trained
in sociological jurisprudence and who had strong commitments to social
engineering." 87 Houston's social engineering, which "[grew] out of tenets
of Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence," strengthened the link between the two jurisprudential traditions."
The Legal Realist movement emerged from the pre-World War I sodological jurisprudence critique of Classical Legal Thought. 9 While many
lution of 1937, and the emergence of the Warren Court era. See generally DAVID
WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PMLOSOPR OF LAW (1974).
82. Reed, supra note 49, at 1097.
83. McNErL, supra note 3, at 217 ("[Houston's] encounter With Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence [was] evident in the premises of the theory that Houston posited

about law, lawyers, and the United States.").
84. Id.
85. Id. at 77-85.

86. RoscoE POUND, AN INTrODUCTION TO TM PMLOSOPHY OF LAW 43 (1975).

87. Joan Roelofs, Judicial Activism as Social Engineering: A Marxist Interpretation of the
Warren Court, in SuREMn COURT AcTIvIsM AND RESTRAINT 254 (Stephen C. Halpem

& Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982).

88. Gerna Rae McNeil, To Meet The Group Needs: The Transformation of the Howard University School of Law, 1920-1935, in NEw PERsPECTnvEs ON BLACK EDUCATIONAL HIsTORY 157 (Vincent P. Franklin & James D. Anderson eds., 1978).
89. See generally Gary J. Aichele, Legal Realism and Twentieth Century American Juris-

prudence: The Changing Consensus [Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia, 1983] (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International); WILI.M W. FISHER, MORTON J. HoRwrTz, & THOMAS A. REED, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1994); WILFRID E. RUMBLE,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1968).
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Realists saw key differences between Pound's theories and their own,
there was substantial common ground between them. 90 Like sociological
jurisprudence, at the "heart of [Legal Realism] was an effort to define and
discredit classical legal theory and practice and to offer in their place a
more philosophically and politically enlightened jurisprudence." 9'
Legal Realism is difficult to define as it "was neither a coherent intel92
lectual movement nor a consistent or systematic jurisprudence." Although "[m]ost generalizations about their work are subject to numerous
exceptions," 93 the Legal Realists can be generally defined as the law professors, judges, and attorneys who, mainly in the interwar period, were
"driven by the twin motives of intellectual discovery and social improvement. They hoped to understand the legal process in a new and more
useful manner, and they94hoped to see both political and legal reform flow
from their discoveries."
Included among the Legal Realists were Felix Cohen, Jerome Frank,
and Karl Llewellyn--some of the most influential legal minds of the era.9 5
However, "[tihe legal realists were a heterodox lot" and accepted the title
"Realist" reluctantly if at all.96 And being autonomous legal thinkers, the
Realists were often disjointed and sometimes contradictory. But those
given the name "Realist"
shared one basic premise-that the law had come to be out of
touch with reality. Holmes' statement that "the life of the law has
not been logic, it has been experience" was its battle cry. Pound's
distinction between the law in books97and the law in action was its
most famous academic formulation.
On its face, Legal Realism would seem to be as compatible with
Houston's social engineering as had sociological jurisprudence. Just as
their sociological jurisprudence predecessors, the Realists, "[i]rreverent,
iconoclastic, and steeped in the political tradition of Progressivism," sought
to bring about fundamental change in both the law and society 9 However, just like many adherents of the progressive reform movement, the
Realists avoided the race issue. 9
Plessy v. Ferguson, which constitutionalized the doctrine of "separatebut-equal" and validated state-sponsored discriminatory Jim Crow laws,
90. RUmBLE, supra note 89, at 13 ("[The debt of the legal realists to Pound [is] dear. To

a degree the realist movement was quite obviously a vigorous reassertion of doctrine
the lineage of which leads back to [Pound].").

91. FismR, Holwrrz, & REED, supra note 89, at xiii-xiv.
92. HoRwrrz, supra note 78, at 169.
93. RUMBLE, supra note 89, at 28.
94. PuRcELL, supra note 78, at 93.
95. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen,
TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv.809 (1935); Karl
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv.
1222 (1931); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REv. 431 (1930).

96.

RUMBLE,

supra note 89, at 28.

97. HoRwr-z, supra note 78, at 187-88.
98. FISHER, HoRwrrz, & REED, supra note 89, at xiii.
99. ROBERT L. ALLEN, RELUCTANT REFORMRs: RAcIsM
IN THE UNrrED STATES 85

(1974).

AND SocIAL REFORM MovEMENTs
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was the product of the era of Classical Legal Thought.-' The Realists,
however, did not attack Plessy as they had attacked the constitutionalization of "freedom-of-contract" in Lochner. Rather, with the exception of a
few, "most canonical Realists... preferred to sidestep the race question
despite its extreme susceptibility to Legal Realist critique."101 However, it
was not the iunwillingness of the Realists to confront racial discrimination
that demonstrated their key incongruity with Houston's social engineering, rather, it was the Realists' aversion to judicial activism.
A significant number of Realists served in the Roosevelt administration and "became ardent New Dealers, sharing a strong hostility to the
method of juristic reasoning that struck down social welfare laws and
wrought what they considered great human injustices."' °2 The Realists
denounced the "mechanical jurisprudence" used by the Classical Legal
Thinkers who, in their view, mistakenly claimed to be guided by established rules when, in fact, they were actively reading their own social and
economic policy preferences into the Constitution:
Out of this progressive critique of the so-called "nine old men"
came the rallying cry of liberal jurisprudence---"judicial restraint."
For a half century until the decision in Brown, the notion that
courts should ordinarily defer to the policies of the legislature
became the principle article of faith of liberal jurisprudence.10 3
Believing that the legislature and administrative agencies-not the
courts-were the rightful social and economic policy makers, Legal Realism "concentrated much of its energy in arguing for statutory or administrative change"' °4 and denounced judicial activism as a tool for thwarting the will of the people:
[L]egal realism encouraged judicial deference to congressional determinations of fact and degree.... If "law" was truly only a set
of determinations based partly on "fact" and partly on the value
judgments of those in power, what right had a court to overturn
the findings of fact and value judgments of the people's elected
representatives?'05
This notion of judicial restraint or deference to the legislature, which
played a central role in Legal Realist thought, was incompatible with
Houston's social engineering philosophy. Implicit in Houston's jurisprudence was a heavy reliance on judges to do just what the realists discouraged-thwart the will of the people when that will denied to certain
citizens their fundamental rights under the Constitution. For this reason,
the link between Houstonian jurisprudence and the progressive legal
tradition ceased with the shift in influence from sociological jurisprudence
100. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

101. Note, Legal Realism and the Race Question: Some Realism About Realism on Race Relations,
108 HAR. L. Rsv. 1607, 1608 (1995).
102. PtrRcELL, supra note 78, at 93.
103. Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudenceof Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HAxv.

C. R.-C. L. L. Rrv. 599, 600 (1979).
104. HoRwrrz, supra note 78, at 170.
105. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND TH CONSTITUTION 167 (1987).
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to Legal Realism. This tension between Houston and the Realists illuminates an important period in American legal history when judicial activism began to be transformed from a tool for the protection of private
property rights to a tool for the protection of civil rights.
While many place this point at the 1954 Supreme Court decision in
Brown, it came much sooner. During the mid to late 1930s, while Houston
was special counsel to the NAACP, judicial activism began to be used
increasingly as a viable tool for the attack on segregation and discrinination.'06 This is a full two decades before the popularly recognized end of
the "half-century-old, post-Lochner Progressive commitment to judicial
restraint."10 7 Furthermore, the Warren Court activism was not a sudden
break with tradition, but was the result of a carefully planned litigation
attack on the logic of Plessy waged by Houston and his contemporaries.
As early as the 1938 Supreme Court case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,1s which Houston argued, "the first systematic Supreme Court
attention to racial discrimination was beginning."' °9 Houston and his contemporaries should be credited with ending the "progressive consensus"
of adherence to judicial restraint and laying the groundwork for the
Warren Court's personal rights substantive due process activism. 10
V. WHY THE COURTS? HOUSTONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
As discussed above, central to Legal Realism was deference to the
legislature on matters of economic and social policy. This notion was
anathema to Houston's social engineering philosophy, which was marked
by a mistrust of legislative channels. Implicit in Houston's attack on
state-sponsored discrimination was a reliance on the courts to actively
strike down discriminatory state laws and restore meaning to the Civil
War amendments and Reconstruction civil rights legislation that had been
"emptied of meaning by the Supreme Court in decision after decision.""'
This strategy was, thus, a call for judicial activism-the tool that was
despised by Legal Realism, the "progressive" legal movement of the time.
However, what was most peculiar about Houston's embrace of judicial
activism was the reality that it was
a tool that had been used to deny
n2
century"
a
over
for
Blacks
to
rights
For those interested in the constitutional rights of American Blacks,
judicial activism-and, arguably, the Supreme Court itself-had long been
106. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
107. HoRwrrz, supra note 78, at 247.

108. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
109. RICHARD L.

PACELLE, Tim TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT's AGENDA: FROM
THE NEW DEAL TO TlE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 161 (1991).

110. But see HoRwrrz, supra note 78, at 247,254; WOLFE, supra note 1, at 25; Horwitz, supra

note 103, at 599.
111. William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution,40 VAND. L.
REv. 1343, 1348 (1987).
112. See generally BLACK AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT SINCE EMANCIPATION:
BETRAYAL OR PROTECTION? (Arnold M. Paul ed., 1972); LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THBE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND TBlE NEGRO
(1966); THE SUPREME COURT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION Uoseph Tussman ed., 1963).

34 m HARVARD BLACKLETTBR LAW JOURNAL E VOL. 14, 1998
more foe than friend. In the 1842 case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 3 the
Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute which protected its
free Blacks from the Fugitive Slave Act. The law required any person
seeking to remove an alleged runaway slave from Pennsylvanian borders
to first obtain judicial approval from a state or federal judge. The Court
held that the state law violated both the fugitive slave clause of the
Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.114 By reading into the
fugitive slave clause the authority of Congress to regulate fugitive retrieval as well as a constitutional property right in slaves, the Court
reasoned that "any state legislation on the subject was unconstitutional." 5
This included state legislation "that established mandatory procedures
which gave alleged fugitives the opportunity
to prove their freedom and
6
protect themselves from enslavement."
Perhaps the most notorious example of judicial activism harming the
constitutional status of Blacks can be found in Dred Scott v. Sanford.117 Here,
the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Roger Taney,
struck down the anti-slavery provision of the Missouri Compromise, stating that Congress had no power to exclude slavery from the territories., 8
But worse from the Blacks' perspective was the other portion of this badly
reasoned ruling, where Taney asserted that Scott had no standing to sue
because Blacks, regardless of condition of servitude, could not be citizens
and "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." 9 This
clearly activist decision, which was not grounded in the text or meaning
of the Constitution and read the Court's policy preferences into the Constitution, stripped Blacks of their constitutional existence-an existence
that would not be restored in theory until the passage of the Civil War
amendments.120
The Supreme Court, however, would again take an activist stance and
wipe out many of the legislative gains made by Blacks through the postCivil War civil rights legislation. In The Civil Rights Cases (1883),21 the
Supreme Court held that the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional as it applied to acts of private discrimination."2 Although the
ruling left the door open for states to pass anti-discrimination measures,
the political realities of the post-Reconstruction era left little hope for the
passage of such laws in states where they did not already exist. The
Supreme Court's activist neutering of post-Civil War federal civil rights
legislation represented the end of federal protection of the civil rights of
Blacks.

113. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
114. See id. at 622.

115.

DONALD G. NIEMAN,PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRIcAN-AMERIcANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO TE PRESENT 19 (1991).

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 19.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
See id. at 452.
Id. at 407.
But see Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong
Document? 40 VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1337-42 (1987).
121. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

122. Id. at 25.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)123 represented the beginning of an era of legal segregation and discriminatory
state action that would rule the South for more than a half century. In this
case, the.Supreme Court, guided more by 19th century scientific racism
than legislative intent, read into the Fourteenth Amendment the doctrine
of "separate but equal." 124 Refusing to invalidate a Louisiana state law that
separated the races in train cars, the Court held that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had not intended social equality, but rather only
"absolute equality of the races before the law."125 The Court also asserted
that if, as the petitioner claimed, Blacks were stigmatized by laws that
isolated them, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." 26 The
lone dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan stated that the activist decision would one day "prove to be quite as pernicious as... the Dred Scott
case."'1' Harlan was correct, as this activist decision gave birth to Jim
Crow laws throughout the South.'2

Recognizing that the Supreme Court had promoted the diminution of
the constitutional status of Blacks, the judiciary seemed the least likely
place for Houston to concentrate his civil rights efforts: "From the founding of the nation until the Civil War, the Court aggressively rejected
inroads upon the constitutionally protected right to own slaves." 29 The
Supreme Court after the Civil War consistently "upheld the constitution-

ality of laws and practices under which Negroes were reduced to second
class citizenship."

3°

With this historical background, the question remains

why Houston and his contemporaries selected the courts as their vehicle
and encouraged judicial activism as their sword and shield for racial
justice.
Some developments after the turn of the century may illuminate the
reasons for Houston's choice of judicial activism as a tool. Houston believed that "the classical liberal argument for judicial restraint [n]ever
really made sense" as it was a pragmatic ideology meant for "restraining
conservative judges who were interfering too much with a long overdue
" 3
program of social reform at the beginning of the twentieth century. '
Under this conception, judicial activism was not a "conservative" tool,
merely because courts that had used it were considered protective of
conservative ends. Decades before the Legal Realists, Houston's social
engineering philosophy saw judicial activism as a tool that could be used
for the benefit of any ideological position, as long as judges were sympathetic to the cause in question.1 32
123.
124.
125.
126.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See NiEMAN, supra note 115, at 111.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
Id. at 551.

127. Id. at 559.
128. See generally C. VANN
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CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).

129. Randall L. Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1622, 1623 (1986).
130. Id. at 1623.
131. Horwitz, supra note 103, at 600.
132. See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
CARDozo L. Rsv. 601, 677-78 (1993).
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While finding judges sympathetic to his cause was, on the whole, still
a discouraging proposition for Houston in the 1920s and 1930s, some
trends could be identified that may have brightened the outlook somewhat. During the years between 1910 and 1921, the Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Edward Douglass White "breathed some life into Reconstruction principles that had been comatose for more than two decades.""'
The Supreme Court, under the leadership of an ex-Confederate soldier,
took a surprisingly activist stance toward civil rights, striking down state
laws that denied Blacks the right to vote,M supported peonage,'5 and
expanded segregation. 1 6 In addition, the 1920s saw the Supreme Court
expand its protection of speech and religion.137 These small, but bright
lights in an otherwise dark era may have offered Houston encouragement
on the efficacy of judicial activism for the cause of civil rights.
However, Houston's choice becomes even clearer when the political
context of the time is considered. A racial caste system existed in the
southern United States when Houston waged his legal battles in the 1930s
and 1940s.1' These patterns of racial discrimination throughout the southern states included restrictions on employment, educational opportunity,
voting, rights in court trials, admission to public accommodations, interpersonal relations, membership in organizations, and residency. 9 This
system of segregation was supported by laws and enforced by the police.
Where this was not sufficient, mob 14rule
and lynchings maintained the
0
balance of power between the races.
The situation in the North was little better than in the South: "The
total system of constraints upon blacks in the North was considerably less
than in the South; however, in certain areas, there was very little difference." 141 Most Northern cities, with the possible exception of some in New
England, maintained a system of racial restrictions on housing, occupational positions, lending practices, municipal services, and access to public
accommodations and city services02 In cities like New York and Chicago, the
presence of large immigrant groups compounded the oppression of newly migrated Blacks who were trapped at the bottom of a three-tiered social system.10
133. Benno C. Schmidt, Principleand Prejudice:The Supreme Courtand Race in the Progressive
Era, Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 CoLum. L. REv. 444,446 (1982). But see generally
Kennedy, supra note 129.
134. See, e.g., Guinn & Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915).
135. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S.
133 (1914).
136. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
137. See WOLFE, supra note 1, at 22.
138. See generallyJOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SoUrrERN TowN (1957); CHARLES
S. JOHNSON, PArrTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION (1943); GUiNAR MYRDAL, AN AME1UCAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
139. RICHARD M. BuRKEY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED

STATES 29-31 (1971).
140. See MYRDAL, supra note 138, at 558-69. See also RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES (Allen D. Grimshaw ed., 1969); IDA B. WELLs-BARNE,
ON LYNCHINGS (1990);
WALTER WHITE, ROPE AND FAGGOT: A BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE LYNCH (1929).

141. BURKEY, supra note 139, at 31.

142. Id. at 30-31.
143. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, TH PROMISED LAND: TE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991).

HOUSTONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM

n 37

This racial caste system produced a concomitant lack of black political
efficacy. In the North, Blacks only influenced politics in areas with a
heavily concentrated black population,'" and in the South, Blacks simply
did not influence politics at all:145
Since the turn of the century, a host of legal and extralegal devices
had been in place that prohibited the great majority of southern
blacks from exercising a fundamental democratic right, the right
to vote. Legal restrictions included the poll tax, property requirements, literacy tests, understanding clauses, and the all-white primary. With the exception of the white primary impartial administration of these laws would have eliminated a large number of
potential white voters, and it did in some cases. But in most
instances, local registrars had almost unlimited power in administering the registration laws and used them to disqualify blacks,
regardless of their qualifications. If these obstacles were not sufficient
to deter potential black voters, local whites routinely relied on
terror and violence.46
While Blacks were largely unrepresented in America's halls of political
power, many of those who were represented seemed disinterested in, if
not opposed to, Black demands for fair treatment. In addition to the
political marginalization at the local and state levels, Blacks faced hostility
from the federal government. 47 In the legislative branch, the representatives
and senators often mirrored the racial attitudes of those they represented,
which meant bitter opposition to civil rights initiatives from many southern Congressmen.'" Even while the New Deal federalism "implicitly challenged the southern structure of state's rights supported by legalized
white supremacy,"' 1 liberals within Congress were no match for the southern
Democrat voting blocs that were vital to the passage of Roosevelt's New
Deal initiatives. The southern congressional delegations were in a position
to both reduce the effectiveness of New Deal programs in providing
144. See
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economic relief to Blacks and to protect the racial norms within their own
states:
While the New Deal marked a break with the past, it neither
eliminated discrimination from federal programs, won enactment
of federal civil rights legislation, nor made civil rights issues a top
priority. Southern Democrats controlled key congressional committees and were a force to be reckoned with on Capitol Hill.
Consequently, many New Deal administrators were reluctant to
root out discrimination in relief and recovery programs in the
South because they feared antagonizing powerful committee chairmen who controlled their agencies' appropriations. 1' °
Besides fending off any threats the New Deal programs might pose to
the racial caste system, southern segregationists were also adept at fighting
federal civil rights laws: "Southern legislative power-especially skillful
use of the filibuster-also thwarted efforts by liberals to enact federal
legislation outlawing lynching and the poll tax."151 The threat of violence
was the cement that solidified the racial caste system, with opposition to
anti-lynching laws being particularly fierce. The NAACP tried unsuccessfully for nearly four decades to pass substantive anti-lynching legislation
in the face of hostile segregationists in the House and Senate.15 2 In 1938,
opponents filibustered an anti-lynching bill for almost six weeks.'
Hope of leadership from the executive branches was thin, as recent
history had taught.lM Theodore Roosevelt, while aligned with the Progressives, was also guilty of their sins, including flirtings with White supremacy. 55 William Howard Taft bowed to southern pressure and refused to
appoint Blacks to federal posts in the South or speak out against lynchings.'Woodrow Wilson, a "moderate" Northerner, aggressively segregated the
federal government. 57 Warren G. Harding opposed social equality and
further segregated the federal government."' Calvin Coolidge also tolerated segregation in the federal government.59 Herbert Hoover nominated
Judge John J.Parker, whom many considered to be a racist, to the Supreme Court.16 Even Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose rise to power was
150. NIEMAN, supra note 115, at 132-33.

151. Id. at 132-33.
152. See generally ROBERT
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nard Sternsher ed., 1969).
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ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1971).
155. See RomEo B. GARRurr, THE PRESIDENTS AND THE NEGRO 213 (1982).
156. GARRTT, supra note 155, at 222-27.
157. Id. at 230-34.
158. Id. at 244-46.
159. Id. at 256.
160. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JusTIcEs AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1992). Parker was defeated largely through
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initially perceived as "a shot in the arm for Negroes," 161 often equivocated
on matters of Black civil rights.162
With the lack of cooperation from the executive branch and the hostility within the legislative branch, Houston realized that litigation was
the best option. Houston, however, did not fail to recognize the limitations
of his court centered strategy: "Notwithstanding his devotion to litigation,
Houston refused to place blind trust in the nation's courts. How could
he? He litigated in the era of Plessy, an era in which the courts were as
much the pillars of American apartheid as they were parties to its ultimate
dismantling."16 Houston realized that many judges, despite their supposed independence, were often responsive to the same political pressures
as legislators: "[Flormal safeguards [such as life tenure and salary protection] cannot be relied upon to ensure that judges will operate free of the
influence of majoritarian preference when they endeavor to protect minority interests."' 6
As a result, "the Supreme Court [or any court for that matter] is
ultimately unable to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority."16 Realizing that Blacks could not "depend upon the judges to fight
all of [their] battles nor... dump all of their problems in the lawyers'
laps and go off to sleep," Houston emphasized additional methods of
achieving his goals.16 Among these techniques were increased political
participation and control over lawmakers, despite the impediments. 67
Houston also emphasized economic solidarity and direct-action when
absolutely necessary.'6 Far from ignoring other aspects of the struggle for
racial justice, Houston's "concurrent warnings about the limitations of the
judicial system proved indispensable to the larger civil rights struggle." 69

161. Sullivan, supra note 146, at 82.
162. Although Roosevelt had shifted significant Black political loyalty to the Democrats
from the party of Lincoln, he reluctantly answered to the demands made by his new
constituency. Houston learned this from his experience in the NAACP's anti-lynching
campaign when he often had to encourage his colleagues to "put the screws on
Roosevelt" to provide party leadership. ZANGRANDO, supra note 152, at 127 (quoting
letter from Houston to Walter White, Mar. 11, 1935, Box C-64, NAACP-Library of
Congress). See also SrroF, supra note 26, at 288. In addition to pressuring Roosevelt's
Justice Department to integrate the federal judiciary, Houston "suggested that [it]
ought to more actively intervene whenever a citizen's civil rights were unprotected

locally" MARY
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167. See McNEiL, supra note 3, at 197.
168. See generally Smith, supra note 47; Hobbs, supra note 49.
169. McNE L, supra note 3, at 220.

40 m HARVARD BLACKLETTER LAW JOURNAL 0 VOL. 14, 1998
However, as has been discussed, considering the political realities of
the times, along with the relative apathy of the executive branch and the
hostility of the legislative branch, Houston's focus on the courts is certainly understandable. The protection against discrimination and the alleviation of segregation Houston desired were not possible through legislative or executive channels. The courts were not only a viable vehicle for
racial justice, they also fit with Houston's social engineering philosophy
which called for innovation in forcing reforms as "[t]he choice of litigation
rather than grass-roots activism was based on the consideration that the
courts would be more receptive than other governmental agencies to
arguments for legal equality."' 70
Houston knew that courts were an option for a minority "even when
that minority was without access to the ordinary weapons of democracy." 171 Unlike with the executive and legislative branches, in the courts
"a black man could 'compel a white man to listen," and reforms could be
forced when blacks had no chance through politics."'11 With the lack .of
Black political efficacy, Houston "realized that the very structure of our
government afforded the opportunity for the court, the Supreme Court,
to really be that in-place instrument to do something about [segregation].
..'he
T only -logical instrument for it... [was] a courthouse." 173 In the
courts, Houston prompted the use of the sword and shield of judicial
activism to force the end of legally sanctioned racial discrimination in
America.
VI. USHERING IN THE WARREN COURT ACTIVISM:
HOUSTON'S LEGAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST SEGREGATION
During the twenty years (1930-1950) when Houston was associated
with the NAACP, there was an upward trend of civil rights cases reaching
the Supreme Court.174 This heightened scrutiny of cases dealing with racial
discrimination and the resulting favorable outcomes were due, in large
part, to the efforts of Houston and his court-centered strategy to attack
segregation. 7 5
Houston ran a highly sophisticated and "methodical campaign of
litigation designed to undermine Jim Crow and to nurture grass-roots
civil rights consciousness." 76 Recognizing that the courts were the best
option for the bolstering of civil rights, Houston planned to tap their full
potential. Houston's "well-conceived and well-executed plan of preparation and litigation" focused on six main areas: education, labor, housing,
voting rights, jury exclusion, and transportation.177
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Interview of William B. Bryant, 27 NEw ENG. L. RE. 677, 681-82 (1993).
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Supreme Court agreed to hear and the percentage of outcomes favorable to Negro
litigants leaped significantly after 1937.").
176. NrEMAN, supra note 115, at 116.
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Education was, however, Houston's main focus, especially in the early
years of his advocacy. Recognizing that schooling was the key to further
opportunity, Houston made the attack on discrimination in education the
crown jewel of his strategy. While Houston realized that Plessy was settled
law and therefore attacks on segregated public grammar and high schools
would be futile, he chose to concentrate on the "soft underbelly" of
graduate school education. Houston would only use as plaintiffs Black
applicants who had impeccable academic credentials, so that their denial
of admission to segregated graduate schools dearly had to have been on
account of race. In this way, Houston knew he could establish the precedents that would one day be used to undermine separate-but-equal all

together:
Houston's masterful strategy was to strike at segregation where it
would be most repugnant to well-educated judges-in graduate
and professional schools-and ratchet backward toward his ultimate target: segregation in grade schools and high schools across
the country. 78
In the cases of Pearson v. Murray (1936) 179 and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada (1938),180 Houston persuaded judges to challenge state statutes that
178. Ken Gormley, A Mentor's Legacy: Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall and the
Civil Rights Movement, 78 AMER. BAR ASSN. J. 63, 65 (1992). Houston sought to
capitalize on the fact that judges were highly educated and, thus, would be sensitive
to the nuances of a graduate school education. Judges would especially recognize
the disadvantage created by the dual law school system and other Jim Crow mechanisms, such as out-of-state scholarships given to Black applicants by southern states
that could not provide equal educational opportunity. See KLUGER, supra note 13, at
187.
179. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (1936). Under state law, the University of Maryland
had operated a separate (and substandard) law school for Blacks and offered scholarships to out-of-state law schools for those Blacks whose educational needs could
not be met by the Black school. When Donald Murray, a highly qualified Black
student, was turned down for admission to the main Baltimore campus, Houston,
Thurgood Marshall, and the NAACP sued the university. Finding the Maryland
statute as violative of the doctrine of "separate-but-equal," the judge issued a writ
of mandamus ordering the admission of Murray. The state appealed and the lower
court decision was affirmed Maryland's highest court See id. at 594. Ironically, Thurgood
Marshall, a Maryland native, was rejected from the University of Maryland Law
School on the same grounds in 1930. See CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM
BREAKERs: THM WORLD OF JUSTICE ThIRGOOD MARSHALL 5 (1993).
180. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The state of Missouri, under statute, maintained separate White
and Black law schools. The University of Missouri Law School had facilities and
faculty far superior to Lincoln University, the school for Black students. Houston and
the NAACP took the case of Lloyd Gaines, an exemplary Black student who had
been denied admission to the better school, all the way to the Supreme Court which
held that a state is bound to admit a qualified Black student to the White state law
school or "furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education substantially
equal" to the all-White law school. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337, 351 (1938). This effectively disposed of the "out-of-state scholarship" as a means
for avoiding the offering of equal educational opportunity in legal education. Because
achieving this equality was virtually impossible in segregated schools, states were
under pressure to integrate, as did the state of Missouri. Ironically, Gaines never
showed up at the final hearing and has not been seen nor heard from since. Thurgood
Marshall, Houston's co-counsel in the case, believed that Gaines was lynched before
he could integrate the law school. See Gormley, supra note 178, at 65. This highlights
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required separate law schools for Black students. The results in these
landmark education cases opened the way for several other key cases, all
of which Houston worked on. The 1948 case of Sipuel v. Oklahoma State

Regents 8' and three 1950 cases, McCready v. Byrd,'82 McLaurin v. Oklahoma
4 all helped to open the doors of
State Regents,In and Sweatt v. Painter'1

graduate school education to all citizens, regardless of race.
Houston's advocacy also prompted the Court to take activist stances

in the face of state laws that failed to provide equal protection to Black
citizens in other aspects of life. In the area of labor, Houston secured

landmark decisions in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
(1944)'8 and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen
(1944).'1 In the famous housing discrimination case, Shelley v. Kraemer
(1948) and its companion cases,187 Houston successfully argued that the
Court should outlaw the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants by
state and federal goverments.'m And in the case of Hollins v. Oklahoma,'89
Houston convinced the Court to declare that discriminatory jury exclusion

could warrant the overturning of a conviction. 90 Time and time again,
state action was thwarted by a Supreme Court called upon by Houston
to take an activist stance.

Charles Hamilton Houston left an indelible mark on American law:
"The extent to which [Houston's] legal advocacy has altered the course of
American law and history is yet unmeasured and untold."1 91 Several of
the cases in which Houston was a key strategist or litigant "must be
recognized for the principles they established in American constitutional

law."'92 Even after Houston's death, those "social engineers" Houston
influenced would go on to bring about some of the most significant

Supreme CQurt decisions in American history. Houston's work and influence
in these cases is, perhaps, the most lasting demonstration of his legacy:

"The cases Houston influenced and those in which he participated are
the dangers that plagued both the plaintiffs and lawyers during these legal attacks
on state-sponsored discrimination.
181. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).

182. 195 Md. 131 (1950).
183. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).

184. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The decision in Sweatt v. Painter,which integrated the University
of Texas Law School, was particularly important because it posed a direct challenge
to the doctrine of "separate-but-equal" put forth in Plessy. The Court emphasized
"intangibles" as being as important as physical facilities when determining the parity
of the Black and White state law schools, see id. at 633-34, which foreshadowed Brown
and its reasoning. See NrmAN, supra note 115, at 147.
185. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

186. 323 U.S. 210 (1944). In these cases, Houston successfully convinced the Court to read
into the Railway Labor Act an implicit intolerance for discrimination on the part of
the labor unions engaged in collective bargaining. See McNeil, supranote 3, at 168-71.
187. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Sipes v. McGhee, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Urciolo v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); McNEm, supra note 3, at 181-85.
188. See Leland Ware, Charles Hamilton Houston: The Leading Strategist Against Restrictive
Covenant Cases, 2 NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAC. 24 (Dec., 1988); Leland Ware, Shelley v.
Kraemer and the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 2 NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG. 23 (Dec., 1988).
189. 295 U.S. 394 (1935).
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substantialprecedents unlikely to be overturned by contemporary Supreme
Court jurists." 9 '
Houston cleverly "devised an antisegregation strategy that paid fealty
to the law's own conservatism" 91 4 and turned the doctrine of "separatebut-equal" against itself, securing substantial gains. He "push[ed] the
doctrine of separate but equal to its logical limits. Houston knew that
separate was never intended to be equal, and that under its strict application, the doctrine would fall of its own weight." 9 ' His well-planned
litigation strategy struck at Jim Crow laws where they were most vulnerable and prompted the Court to slowly, but syllogistically, question the
constitutionality of the doctrine of "separate-but-equal": "If the Supreme
Court in the 1930s did not cripple9 6the underpinnings of the Jim Crow
system, it did make them wobble."
Houston achieved success by encouraging judicial activism for progressive ends. By the time Brown and Boiling were decided, "the philosophy of judicial restraint began to look less attractive to the.. . 'progressives'."9 It was dear that Houston had dissolved the progressive commitment
to judicial restraint as "certain of those lawyers who had applauded
Holmes' dissent in Lochner were also applauding the decision in Brown."98
Houston's social engineering prompted the shift from economic rights
activism to personal rights activism and "[a]s a result, where the old
activist decisions prior to 1937 merely blocked legislative initiatives in
order to maintain the status quo, the decisions of the 1950s and 1960s...
were to force major changes in the established legal and social order." 199
Houston's unique and innovative legal strategy laid the groundwork
for Brown and Boiling when the focus would be not on fulfilling the
promise of "separate-but-equal" but, rather, exposing its hypocrisy. Houston, by introducing judicial activism as a tool for progressive ends, transformed American constitutional history. Thus, Houston helped to effect
some of the most fundamental changes in American law and society. His
contribution to American jurisprudence, though often overlooked, is as
great as that of any jurist thus far.
VILCONCLUSION: THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM
The saga of Houston and his battle against segregation offers a lesson
for the future of judicial activism. As has been discussed, the political
circumstances faced by Houston required him to rely upon judicial activism to further his legal strategy. Obviously, in the case of the legal attack
on segregation, "[tlhe use of constitutional adjudication as an instrument
of reform made ours a freer, more equal, and more humane society." 21°
193. Id.
194. Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter? 90 McH. L. REv. 1216, 1223 (1992).
195. Hobbs, supra note 49, at 515.
196. SrrKo ,supra note 26, at 243.

197. Cox, supra note 105, at 177.
198. Neil Duxbury The Theory and History of American Law and Politics,13 OXlORD J. LEGAL
STuD.249, 252 (1993).

199. Cox, supra note 105, at 182.
200. Id. at 182-83.
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However, it must be remembered that while Houston's carefully planned
strategy minimized the "usually high chances" 201 for adverse decisions,
there always existed the possibility that the Supreme Court might actually
strengthen the foundations of Plessy, which was, itself, an activist decision.
There is a danger in thinking like some proponents of judicial activism
who have "objected to the Supreme Court adjudicating politically only
when they disapproved of the Court's politics." 2 Once we vest the courts
with policy-making power, we cannot easily take it back. While this may
not be a concern to those whose causes hold the sympathies of the Court
at a given moment, in time, the structure of the judiciary changes and
ideological balances shift, leaving formerly protected causes to the will of
the new majority. This means that judicial activism will produce decisions
both favorable and unfavorable and "for every Brown there is likely to be
a Lochner."20 3
So where does this leave us? Houston's strategy of securing activist
decisions was the most prudent method of working to overturn Plessy,
another activist decision. In addition, without making a value judgment
on judicial activism, it is clear that Houston's strategy presents a special
case because he was working to restore fundamental rights denied to
certain Americans because of their race. When the legislature tyrannically
infringes upon the constitutionally protected rights of the minority, the
courts should step in, as they did in Brown and the other cases influenced
by Houston.
However, we must recognize the dangers associated with judicial
activism. Not every instance of judicial activism has the same constitutional grounding as the cases Houston litigated. A contemporary activist
Court has the potential to erase the civil rights gains of the last thirty
years, just as the 19th century courts erased the civil rights gains of the
Reconstruction era. As the twenty-first century approaches, we will continue to examine the nature and function of judicial review in the American constitutional order. In the process, we must not fail to look to the
past and recognize that judicial activism can, indeed, be a double-edged
sword.

201. McNErL, supra note 3, at 223.
202. Duxbury supra note 198, at 251-52.
203. Id. at 252.

